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1. Executive summary 
The nuclear power programme envisaged by the South African government and Eskom would 
require the expenditure of about R400bn of public money to build the plants (see Appendix). 
Waste disposal and decommissioning would cost an additional sum of a similar order of 
magnitude. A new nuclear programme should be launched only with the full and informed 
consent of the South African public. Such a huge commitment of public money should not be 
rushed or short-circuited. A realistic view of the nuclear programme suggests that even if no 
new problems are encountered, new nuclear capacity cannot start making a significant 
contribution to South African electricity supplies before about 2020. So nuclear is, at best, 
irrelevant to the current issues facing the South African electricity industry and, at worst, a 
dangerous distraction from dealing with urgent issues. 
This paper examines what has gone wrong with the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor programme 
and what the future prospects are. It looks at the proposed programme of ‘conventional’ 
nuclear power plants assessing how realistic the targets are. Finally, it examines the risks and 
consequences of relying on nuclear power to meet South Africa’s electricity needs. It 
concludes that a new nuclear programme should be launched only with the full and informed 
consent of the South African public.  
The PBMR programme needs a fresh, independent review that is open to full public scrutiny. 
Costs and time estimates have escalated out of control, markets and partners have not 
emerged, and targets and deadlines have been consistently missed. The Government seems to 
have no clear idea how the project should be run. The next phase of the project will require 
more than five times as much public money as has been spent so far. The most recent estimate 
of about R15bn for this phase is likely to be an under-estimate. The expected commercial 
orders to follow on from the Demonstration plant might cost around R76bn (see Appendix). 
Turning back once this phase has been embarked on will be politically even more unpalatable 
than abandoning the project is now. It is therefore essential that before further public money 
is spent that the project should be subject to independent scrutiny. Among the issues that 
should be covered are: 
 Can a design be produced that satisfies the National Nuclear Regulator? 
 Will the construction cost of such a design be competitive? 
 Can it be assumed that PBMR plants will be reliable and economic? 
 Will there be a market for PBMRs outside South Africa? 
The proposals for ‘conventional’ nuclear power plants seem little better thought out. The 
time-scales seem highly optimistic and the advantages that were said to make the PBMR so 
attractive would be lost. These ‘conventional’ designs have been under development for about 
15 years, and their design characteristics were known when the PBMR programme was 
launched. So it is hard to understand why, if they were so unattractive a decade ago, they are 
now a good option. They remain unproven in operation and the only construction experience 
to date, in Finland, has been appalling. 
One of the main costs of the PBMR programme has been the ‘opportunity cost’ of not 
improving energy efficiency to anything like best practice and of not developing South 
Africa’s sustainable energy sources, such as wind, biomass and solar. Had the money and 
resources spent on the PBMR been spent on energy efficiency and renewables, the problems 
of black-outs experienced in the Cape region in 2006 might have been much less severe. 
There would also not be the aura of panic that seems now to surround decision-making on the 
power sector. There can be little confidence that the latest proposals are any better conceived 
than previous proposals. The risk of such a large programme is that for the next 10-15 years, 
South Africa will be locked into an expensive nuclear programme that will have absorbed 
many of the available resources, but which will have come to nothing or will have produced 
only one or two ‘white elephants’. There will be few resources to develop options that could 
have helped South Africa meet its energy needs in a more sustainable way, such as energy 
efficiency and renewables. Equally, it will be difficult to take advantage of developments 
elsewhere in the world on renewables and energy efficiency. 
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2. Introduction 
Despite apparent decisions by the new ANC government in the mid-1990s not to pursue civil 
nuclear power, Eskom began work on developing a new design of nuclear power plant in 
1993, the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) although this was not made public until 
1998. Progress with this design has been very slow and by 2006, the programme was more 
than a decade late. In response to an apparent need for a large amount of new power station 
capacity, Eskom and the South African government announced their intention in 2006 to 
pursue what they called ‘conventional nuclear technology’. Eskom announced in 2007 that it 
expected to build up to 20,000MW of nuclear capacity (presumably PBMR and conventional 
nuclear) by 2025. This would be equivalent to building ten nuclear power stations equivalent 
in size to the one existing South African nuclear power plant at Koeberg. Such a programme 
would require an investment in the region of R400bn just for the construction of the plants 
with further cost of the same order of magnitude to decommission the plants at the end of 
their life and dispose of the waste. 
This paper examines what has gone wrong with the PBMR programme and what the future 
prospects for it are. It then looks at the proposed programme of ‘conventional’ nuclear power 
plants assessing how realistic the targets are. Finally, it examines the risks and consequences 
of relying on nuclear power to meet South Africa’s electricity needs. 
3. The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 
The PBMR has been under development in South Africa since about 1993, although it was 
not until 1998 that these efforts were publicised. Eskom formally took a license with a 
German company, HTR, for pebble bed technology in 1999. It was expected in 1998 that 
work on construction of a demonstration plant would begin in 1999 and be complete before 
2003 to allow commercial orders soon after (see D R Nicholls, 2000). Eskom projected that 
the market would be about 30 units per year, about 20 of which would be exported. In April 
2000, the South African Cabinet approved Eskom’s continuation and completion of a 
Detailed Feasibility Study (DFS) on the proposed PBMR. Subsequently, Eskom formed a 
company, PBMR (Pty) Ltd to develop and market the technology. PBMR (Pty) Ltd foresaw 
four phases: research and development (already then completed), feasibility study (then 
underway), demonstration, and commercial application. 
Since then, the timetable has slipped so that the Demonstration Plant, planned to be built at 
Koeberg, is not now forecast by PBMR Co to be in service before 2012 at the earliest, 
although recent delays make a 2012 completion date implausible. The Demonstration Plant 
would have to run for, say three years, to prove the technology works. This issue of proving 
the technology was taken up in the Revised Final Environmental Scoping Report (RFESR) 
published in January 2007 (Mawatsan, 2007, p 55). It divides ‘demonstration’ into 
demonstration of functional integrity and demonstration of commercial performance. It lists 
13 separate attributes that should be demonstrated. Three of these will take at least three years 
to be partially demonstrated (plant availability, plant efficiency and sustainability, operational 
and maintenance cost, and first outage). Eleven of them will take at least seven years to be 
fully demonstrated (e.g., main power system integrity and helium leakage verification). 
Even if construction and operation of the Demonstration Plant goes entirely to plan and no 
problems emerge and we assume partial demonstration is a sufficient basis for commercial 
orders to be placed, this means commercial orders could not be placed before mid-2017, with 
first power from the first commercial plant in 2021. So in less than ten years since the PBMR 
programme was made public, the timescale for the first commercial units has slipped by about 
15 years. 
Costs have also escalated alarmingly. In 2000, Eskom’s estimates suggested that the cost of 
the Demonstration phase would be about R2bn (Thomas, 2006). However, in August 2005 
Ferreira confirmed that the estimated cost of the demonstration phase had increased again to 
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R14.5bn1. There has not been a more recent published estimate than this, but it would be 
extremely surprising if the latest cost estimate was not substantially higher. 
The PBMR Programme has disappointed in other ways. There has long been a promise from 
the PBMR Co that partners would be brought in to share risks, bring in additional technical 
skills and open up new markets. A number of partners have been brought in, including the 
government’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 2002 with 25 per cent. However, 
some have withdrawn (a US utility, Exelon) and others reduced their stake (the nationally-
owned UK fuel cycle company, BNFL). Eskom itself has been trying to distance itself from 
the project by reducing its stake but as prospects of new partners being attracted recede, it is 
now being required to take over the project again. It, and perhaps the South African, 
government are the only reasonably assured investors for the demonstration phase. 
The PBMR programme was launched as an export project with an expectation that 20 units a 
year could be exported. Nine years after the launch, there are no export customers in sight 
and, as with project management, Eskom is likely to be required to bear the burden of keeping 
the project afloat by placing orders for plants even if they represent poor value for money. 
The latest plans foresee Eskom making an initial order of 24 units (4000MW). No estimates 
have been published on the price of commercial PBMR units, but even if we assume PBMR 
units can be built as cheaply as conventional nuclear plants, each unit would cost a little over 
R3bn and the total investment in construction costs alone (excluding decommissioning and 
waste disposal costs) would be about R76bn. 
The most recent blow to the project was the news that the South African safety regulator 
(NNR) had required Eskom and PBMR Co to halt all work on the manufacture of safety 
related components in October 2006. This decision was only made known in response to a 
specific question from the international trade journal, Nucleonics Week, in June 20072. It is 
not clear when this restriction will be lifted and how much delay it will introduce. 
3.1. Eskom’s position 
After initial enthusiasm for the project, Eskom has been seeking to distance itself from it for 
the past five years. The organization developing the PBMR was placed in a separate 
company, PBMR Co, controlled by Eskom and three partner companies but PBMR Co was 
re-absorbed into Eskom in 2005 and is now expected to continue to be owned by Eskom. This 
means that the cost of developing the PBMR will fall on electricity consumers. 
3.2. The government’s position 
The government has been uncertain in its position towards the project. Following a 
government review in January 2004, IDC was expected to take a more prominent role in the 
project, and in November 2004, the CEO of Eskom told the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Trade & Industry that IDC would be replacing Eskom as project leader.3 
However, since then, the role of IDC has been reduced again to that of no more than a passive 
partner. In August 2006, a spokeswoman for Minister of Public Enterprises Alec Erwin said 
that IDC would no longer act as the government's "nominee" or agent in the PBMR project.4 
It is not clear whether this means IDC would have no stake in the demonstration phase. It has 
also emerged that, unreported at the time, IDC had reduced its stake to 13 per cent in 2002. 
Finally, in May 2007, it emerged that the PBMR Co was expected to stay within Eskom 
rather than being run by government5. These continual swings in policy give little confidence 
                                                 
1 Business Day, August 16, 2005, p 2. 
2 Nucleonics Week, June 7, 2007, p 1. 
3 Sunday Times, November 10, 2004. 
4 Nucleonics Week, August 31, 2006, p 3 
5 Business Day, May 3, 2007 
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that government has a clear conception of what it takes to bring a challenging project such as 
this to commercial status. 
3.3. Public information 
One of the major problems throughout the PBMR’s history has been the lack of meaningful 
public information. Eskom, the Government and PBMR Co have seldom volunteered 
information to the South African public about costs and delays. Most information has entered 
the public domain via Nucleonics Week and only in answer to specific questions from the 
newsletter. Nucleonics Week is a highly reputable and authoritative publication, but one 
which very few of the South African public has any access to. This is hard to reconcile with 
the fact that throughout the project’s history, the project has been driven by South African 
taxpayers’ and electricity consumers’ money. As financiers of the project, the South African 
public has a right to expect to be fully informed on how their money is being spent. 
4. The proposal for a ‘conventional’ nuclear plant 
In April 2006, in the wake of severe power shortages in the Cape area following a serious 
error in the maintenance of the existing nuclear power plant at Koeberg, Alec Erwin, the 
DEAT Minister announced that he had asked Eskom to examine the possibility of building a 
‘conventional nuclear power station’ at Koeberg. By February 2007, these plans had been 
firmed up sufficiently that it was forecast that a large plant would be on line by 2014 with a 
total of 2000-3000MW to be completed in the ‘near-term’6 By June, Eskom was saying that it 
was targeting the addition of up to 20,000MW of nuclear capacity by 2025. Are these plans 
any more realistic than those for the PBMR? A number of issues arise: 
 What ‘conventional’ technologies are available and how proven are they? 
 What regulatory burden would this impose? 
 Is the timescale realistic? and 
 How would such a unit fit into the South African system? 
These questions must be put in the context of the statements by Eskom that: ‘By 1993 it had 
become clear that building a new traditional Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) such as 
Koeberg would be prohibitively expensive.’7 They must also be seen in the light of claimed, 
albeit disputed, advantages of the PBMR over conventional nuclear technologies, including 
small size, appropriate for weakly connected regions, use of passive safety design, low 
production of radioactive waste and no need for a large distance from population centres. 
The ‘conventional’ nuclear technologies were known about in 1998. They are evolutions of 
existing designs and, fundamentally, have a great deal in common with the existing Koeberg 
plant, which Eskom spoke disparagingly of when it was trying to promote the PBMR. 
4.1. What ‘conventional’ technologies are available? 
The clear implication from the use by Erwin and Eskom of the word ‘conventional’ is that 
there are well-proven, off-the-peg nuclear designs that South Africa could order with 
confidence. This is far from the case. Of the reactor designs being developed and which are 
currently on offer, there are only two obvious candidates: the European Pressurised Water 
Reactor (EPR) offered by Areva; and the AP-1000 offered by Westinghouse.8 
4.1.1. The EPR 
The EPR (1700MW) has been under development by Areva since 1991, but only two orders 
had been placed by June 2007. One was placed in December 2003 for a plant to be built in 
Finland, while a second order for France was finalized in 2007. Experience with the Finnish 
                                                 
6 Nucleonics Week, February 15, p 14. 
7 http://www.eskom.co.za/nuclear_energy/pebble_bed/pebble_bed.html  
8 See S  Thomas, P Bradford, A Froggatt, D Milborrow (2007) ‘The economics of nuclear power’ 
Greenpeace, London 
 7 
reactor (Olkiluoto 3) has been appalling. After 18 months of construction, the plant was 
already 18 months late and the costs had escalated by about a third. While EPR has received 
safety approval from the French and Finnish authorities, it is not expected to complete its 
review by US authorities until about 2011. If the US authorities require significant design 
changes, as is entirely possible, this will raise questions about the status of existing orders. 
The EPR remains totally unproven in operation and the little experience to date of 
construction is poor. 
4.1.2. The AP-1000 
The AP-1000 (1200MW) has been under development since 1999 and was given regulatory 
approval in 2006 by the US authorities (NRC). It was based on a design, the AP-600, which, 
after more than a decade of development, was given safety approval in 1999. However, by 
that time, it was clear the AP-600 was uneconomic and it was abandoned without ever having 
been built. In December 2006, China placed the first orders for an AP-1000 with four units on 
which construction may start later in 2007. The AP-1000 is unproven in construction and 
operation and is based on a design that is also unproven. It has received regulatory approval in 
the USA, but nowhere else. 
4.2. What regulatory burden would this impose? 
The regulatory burden imposed on NNR by the PBMR will be a huge strain to its human 
resources. A ‘conventional’ nuclear plant cannot be ‘nodded through’ the safety regulatory 
process and a full evaluation needs to be undertaken, albeit that it can draw on existing work 
by the US, French or Finnish authorities. It seems improbable that NNR would have the 
resources to carry out a proper evaluation of the PBMR and a conventional nuclear plant to 
the required standard without serious delays to one or other of the programmes. 
4.3. Is the time-scale realistic? 
If Eskom were to proceed with the conventional nuclear option, it would have to identify a 
site and open a call for tenders. Identifying a site would be hugely controversial and the most 
likely option is Koeberg, where the existing nuclear plants are sited and where the 
demonstration PBMR is expected to be built. An EIA would have to be completed to get 
approval for a site and it is unlikely this process could be completed in less than three years. 
A call for tenders could also take up to three years to be completed (China took longer before 
it ordered the AP-1000 units in 2006) once the call has gone out, vendors have developed and 
submitted their designs and costings, Eskom had evaluated the offers and awarded the 
contracts. So it would be a minimum of 3 years before work could start. Finland expected to 
build its EPR in 54 months but it is already 18 months late, France expects to take about 5 
years to build its order and the UK projects a construction time of six years. All three 
countries have far more recent nuclear experience with construction than South Africa so a 
forecast construction time of less than six years seems optimistic. So the prospect of having a 
plant on-line by 2014 seems improbable and even an accelerated process, where everything 
went without a hitch would be unlikely to see a plant on-line before 2017. It seems unlikely 
that keeping to such a timetable would allow a full and open public consultation. 
For comparison, Tony Blair was reported as saying that the latest UK plans meant that 
‘nuclear power is back on the agenda with a vengeance’.9 This was widely seen as an 
indication that there would be a rapid expansion of nuclear power in the UK. However, if we 
examine the plans in detail, in the central case, there would be a period of eight years in 
which safety approval was undertaken, a site identified and approved and contracts placed. 
This would be followed by a six-year construction programme with first power from a new 
plant in 2021, followed by 2-3 further units by 2026. Already, this timing has slipped when a 
High Court judgement ruled that the consultation process leading to Blair’s statement was 
inadequate and would have to be restarted, delaying the programme by 2-3 years. 
                                                 
9 ‘Blair to push for new wave of nuclear construction in UK’ Nucleonics Week, 18 May 2006 
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Nevertheless, the British forecast of about 15 years from a decision to proceed with a new 
nuclear programme to first power make Erwin’s forecast of seven years seem very optimistic. 
4.3.1. How would such a unit fit into the South African system? 
The favoured site for both the demonstration plant and the first conventional nuclear plant is 
the Cape region, most likely the Koeberg site. This may well give some difficult logistical 
problems of trying to fit the construction of a PBMR, the construction of a conventional 
nuclear plant and the operation of a nuclear plant into one site. In addition, the power 
shortages of 2006 point to the problems of fitting large units into a region that has limited 
electricity demand and has limited connections to the rest of South Africa. The Cape region 
has a maximum demand of about 4000MW and two 900MW units, such as the existing 
plants, is difficult to fit in. If demand is about 3000MW at any one time, replacing the output 
of one unit, if it should break down is going to be very difficult. The EPR would be nearly 
double the output of each unit there now, while the AP-1000 would be about a third larger, so 
unless there was a huge strengthening of the transmission network to allow replacement 
power to be brought in when the plant breaks down (as it inevitably will on occasions), a 
large new nuclear plant would create almost as many problems as it solves. Of course, if the 
transmission network was strong enough to allow the siting of such a large unit in the Cape, 
then there would be no specific reason to site the plant there. 
4.4. Summary 
The proposal for a ‘conventional nuclear’ plant appears ill-thought out and unrealistic. 
Whether, as has been suggested by Erwin, it would be possible to proceed with both a 
conventional nuclear plant and the PBMR programme appears doubtful. Proceeding with both 
would risk scarce South African resources being spread too thinly with the result that, at best, 
neither project would be carried through efficiently. 
5. Conclusions 
The nuclear power programme envisaged by the South African government and Eskom would 
require the expenditure of about R400bn of public money to build the plants. Waste disposal 
and decommissioning would cost an additional sum of a similar order of magnitude. A new 
nuclear programme should be launched only with the full and informed consent of the South 
African public. Such a huge commitment of public money should not be rushed or short-
circuited. A realistic view of the nuclear programme suggests that even if no new problems 
are encountered, new nuclear capacity cannot start making a significant contribution to South 
African electricity supplies before about 2020. So nuclear is, at best, irrelevant to the current 
issues facing the South African electricity industry and, at worst, a dangerous distraction from 
dealing with urgent issues. 
The PBMR programme needs a fresh, independent review that is open to full public scrutiny. 
Costs and time estimates have escalated out of control, markets and partners have not 
emerged, and targets and deadlines have been consistently missed. The Government seems to 
have no clear idea how the project should be run. The next phase of the project will require 
more than five times as much public money as has been spent so far. The most recent estimate 
of about R15bn for this phase is likely to be an under-estimate. The expected commercial 
orders to follow on from the Demonstration plant might cost around R76bn. Turning back 
once this phase has been embarked on will be politically even more unpalatable than 
abandoning the project is now. It is therefore essential that before further public money is 
spent that the project should be subject to independent scrutiny. Among the issues that should 
be covered are: 
 Can a design be produced that satisfies the National Nuclear Regulator? 
 Will the construction cost of such a design be competitive? 
 Can it be assumed that PBMR plants will be reliable and economic? 
 Will there be a market for PBMRs outside South Africa? 
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The proposals for ‘conventional’ nuclear power plants seem little better thought out. The 
time-scales seem highly optimistic and the advantages that were said to make the PBMR so 
attractive would be lost. These ‘conventional’ designs have been under development for about 
15 years, and their design characteristics were known when the PBMR programme was 
launched. So it is hard to understand why, if they were so unattractive a decade ago, they are 
now a good option. They remain unproven in operation and the only construction experience 
to date, in Finland, has been appalling. 
One of the main costs of the PBMR programme has been the ‘opportunity cost’ of not 
improving energy efficiency to anything like best practice and of not developing South 
Africa’s sustainable energy sources, such as wind, biomass and solar. Had the money and 
resources spent on the PBMR been spent on energy efficiency and renewables, the problems 
of black-outs experienced in the Cape region in 2006 might have been much less severe. 
There would also not be the aura of panic that seems now to surround decision-making on the 
power sector. There can be little confidence that the latest proposals are any better conceived 
than previous proposals. The risk of such a large programme is that for the next 10-15 years, 
South Africa will be locked into an expensive nuclear programme that will have absorbed 
many of the available resources, but which will have come to nothing or will have produced 
only one or two ‘white elephants’. There will be few resources to develop options that could 
have helped South Africa meet its energy needs in a more sustainable way, such as energy 
efficiency and renewables. Equally, it will be difficult to take advantage of developments 
elsewhere in the world on renewables and energy efficiency. 
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7. Appendix  Possible cost of a South African nuclear programme 
No estimate of the expected cost of the elements of a South African nuclear 
programme has been published by the South Africa nuclear industry. In any case, on 
the basis of previous forecasts from the South African nuclear industry, such 
estimates would have little credibility. However, we can use recent contract and 
outturn prices to give an order of magnitude of investment cost (excluding 
decommissioning). 
We assume that the programme will compromise a total of 24,000MW, of which, at 
least the 4000MW (24 units) that the government has announced Eskom would buy, 
will be PBMRs. 
The most recent documented order for a nuclear plant was the Olkiluoto plant bought 
by Finland in 2005 for a total cost of €3bn, or €2000/kW. At this cost per kW and 
assuming an exchange rate of €1=R10, the 4000MW of PBMRs would cost R76bn 
and the whole 24,000MW programme would cost R456bn. In fact, after only 18 
months of construction, the Olkiluoto project is at least 25 per cent over budget so this 
cost could well be an underestimate. 
The next most recent documented plant was the Sizewell B nuclear power plant 
completed in Britain in 1995. This cost in excess of £3bn (1995 money) or £2500/kW. 
If we assume inflation of 3 per cent per year, this is about £3500/kW in today’s 
money or R50,000/kW (£1=R14). If the South African programme cost this much, the 
4000MW PBMR programme would cost R200bn and the entire 24,000MW 
programme would cost R1200bn. 
The Sizewell plant was completed largely to time and while it is acknowledged that 
mistakes were made in its construction, this cost is a real cost, not an estimate, so it 
should not be discounted as totally implausible 
